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Abstract
In this paper, we present a new concept called an identity
based ring signcryption scheme (IDRSC). We argue that
this is an important cryptographic primitive that must be
used to protect privacy and authenticity of a collection of
users who are connected through an ad-hoc network, such
as Bluetooth. We also present an efficient IDRSC scheme
based on bilinear pairing.As a regular signcryption scheme,
our scheme combines the functionality of signature and en-
cryption schemes. However, the idea is to have an identity
based system. In our scheme, a user can anonymously sign-
crypts a message on behalf of the group. We show that our
scheme outperforms a traditional identity based scheme,
that is obtained by a standard sign-then-encrypt mecha-
nism, in terms of the length of the ciphertext. We also pro-
vide a formal proof of our scheme with the chosen cipher-
text security under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumption, which is believed to be intractable.
Keywords: Identity-based, Ring Signcryption, Bilinear
Pairing, Cryptography, Privacy and Trust
1. Introduction
The emergence of more powerful computers and net-
works led to the distributed computing phenomenon, in
which an organization’s computing is distributed over
networks, instead of being performed only at a cen-
tral computer installation. Ubiquitous computing plays a
great role in a very difficult integration of human factors,
computer science, engineering, and social sciences. With
the great influence of powerful computers and networks,
∗ Partially supported by National ”211” Project, Project
ID:181070H901, Education of JiangSu Project,Project
ID:03KJA520066.
placing computers in human life would face an essen-
tial problem, namely how to implement trust among the
users that are connected in a network. A specific exam-
ple can be derived from a collection of ad-hoc users, that
are connected via a Bluetooth device. The connection
allows anyone who knows the Bluetooth device address
(BD ADDR) to connect and talk to the each other. How-
ever, how can they be sure that the people that they are
talking to are really the real people who claim who they
are? In some cases, we would also like to protect user’s
privacy. For instance, a parliament member would like
to reveal an important news about the cabinet, but he
would like to remain anonymous. Nevertheless, the news
must be authenticated, or otherwise it could be misused.
An additional requirement that we would like to achieve
is the way the news is spread, namely via an ad-hoc con-
nection like Bluetooth. This way, the only available infor-
mation that can be used is the Bluetooth device address.
In this paper, we present a novel solution by introduc-
ing a new cryptographic primitive called Identity-based
Ring Signcryption Schemes.
The idea of identity-based cryptosystem was intro-
duced by Shamir in his seminal paper in [1]. The main
essence of identity-based cryptosystem is to remove the
need of certification of the public keys, that are required
in the conventional public key cryptography setting. The
public key of each participant is obtained from his/her
public identity, such as email address, IP address com-
bined with a user name, social security number, etc.
that can uniquely identify the participant. This model
requires the existence of a trusted authority called Pri-
vate Key Generator (PKG), whose task is to generate
user’s private key from their identity information, af-
ter a successful identification. Since its introduction in
[1], many identity based schemes have been proposed
(eg. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]) and the most notably one is the
identity-based encryption scheme proposed by Boneh
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and Franklin in [7] that takes advantage of the proper-
ties of suitable bilinear maps (the Weil or Tate pairing)
over supersingular elliptic curves. Other identity based
schemes using pairing were subsequently proposed fol-
lowing this paper [8, 9, 10, 11].
In Asiacrypt 2001, Rivest, Shamir and Tauman firstly
addressed and formalized the notion of ring signatures
[12]. A ring signature can be considered as a simpli-
fied group signature with no manager, no group setup
procedure, and no revocation mechanism, and hence, it
provides signer’s ambiguity. In a ring signature scheme,
the information of all possible signers, i.e. ring members,
serves as a part of the ring signature for the signed mes-
sage. A valid ring signature will convince a verifier that
the signature is generated by one of member in the ring,
without revealing any information about which partici-
pant is the actual signer. Hereby, the anonymity prop-
erty is referred to as signer-ambiguity. The first ID-based
ring signature scheme was proposed by Zhang and Kim
in [13].
The concept of public key signcryption schemes was
proposed by Zheng in [14]. The idea of this kind of prim-
itives is to perform encryption and signature in a single
logical step to obtain confidentiality, integrity, authen-
tication and non-repudiation more efficiently than the
sign-then-encrypt approach. Several efficient signcryp-
tion schemes have been proposed since then, including
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Long after its first introduction, a
formal security proof of signcryption scheme was pro-
posed in [20].
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new concept of identity-based
ring signcryption based on the identity-based ring sig-
nature. Throughout this paper, let IDRSC denote our
identity-based ring signcryption. With the IDRSC, a
user can anonymously signcrypts a message on behalf
of a set of users including himself. Our scheme is mo-
tivated by Herranz and Sáez’s ID-based ring signature
scheme proposed in [21]. The underlying security model
is based on the difficulty of the Decisional BilinearDiffie-
Hellman problem. The length of our ciphertext is shorter
compared to the traditional sign-then-encrypt method.
Hence, our scheme is more practical.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review some preliminaries
that will be used throughout this paper.
2.1. Basic Concepts on Bilinear Pairings
Let G1, G′1 be cyclic additive groups generated by
P1, P
′
1, respectively, whose order are a prime q. Let G2 be
a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. We
assume there is an isomorphism ψ : G′1 → G1 such that
ψ(P ′1) = P1. Let ê : G1 × G′1 → G2 be a bilinear map-
ping with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all
P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G′1, a, b,∈ Zq.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G′1 such
that ê(P, Q) = 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute ê(P, Q) for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G′1.
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G′1 and P1 = P
′
1.
We note that our scheme can be easily modified for a
general case, when G1 = G′1.
Complexity Assumptions
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and Decisional
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
Definition 1 Given two groups G1 and G2 of the same
prime order q, a bilinear map ê : G1×G1 → G2 and a gen-
erator P of G1, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
(BDHP) in (G1, G2, ê) is to compute ê(P, P )abc given
(P, aP, bP, cP ).
• TheDecisionalBilinearDiffie-Hellman problem (DB-
DHP) is, given a tuple of points (P, aP, bP, cP ) and
an element h ∈ G2, to decide whether h ?= ê(P, P )abc
holds.
• We define the advantage of a distinguisher against the
DBDH problem as follows.
Adv(B) = |Pa,b,c∈RFq,h∈RG2 [1 ← B(aP, bP, cP, h)]
−Pa,b,c∈RFq [1 ← B(aP, bP, cP,
ê(P, P )abc)]
• The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is
no harder than the computational bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem. However, there is no known
polynomial algorithm that can solve the decisional bi-
linear Diffie-Hellman problem efficiently.
3. Formal Model of Identity based Ring
Signcryption Schemes
Definition 2 An identity based ring signcryption scheme
consists of the following algorithms.
Setup: given a security parameter k, the private key
generator (PKG) generates the system’s public para-
meters.
Keygen: given an identity ID, the PKG computes the
corresponding private key DID and delivers it to the
user via an authenticated channel.
Signcryption: To send a message m to the receiver
Bob whose identity is IDB, Alice chooses some other
users to formagroupU including herself and computes
Signcrypt (U , IDB ,m) on the behalf of the group U to
obtain the ciphertext C.
2
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Unsigncryption: when Bob receives the ci-
phertext C, to get the plaintext he computes
Unsigncrypt(U , DIDB , C) and obtains the plain
text m or the symbol ⊥ if C was an invalid ci-
pher text between the group U and Bob.
Consistency
An identity based ring signcryption scheme is said to be
consistent iff
Pr [C ← Signcrypt(U , IDB ,m),
m ← Unsigncrypt(U , DIDB , C) ] = 1
3.1. Security Notions
Baek et. al. gave a formal security definition of sign-
cryption in [20]. Our definition of the security of iden-
tity based ring signcryption scheme is a natural adap-
tation of theirs. We define our security requirement for
identity based ring signcryption as follows.
Definition 3 Wesay that an identity based ring signcryp-
tion (IDRSC) is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen
ciphertext ring attacks(IND-IDRSC-CCA) if there exists
no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible
advantage in the following game:
• The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a secu-
rity parameter k and sends the system parameters to
the adversary A.
• The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded
number of requests:
– Signcryption request: A produces a set of
users U , an identity IDj and a plaintext
m. The challenger randomly chooses a user
ui ∈ U whose identity is IDi and computes
DIDi = Keygen(IDi). Then the challenger
acts as ui to Signcrypt(U , IDj , m) on the be-
half of U and sends the result to A.
– Unsigncryption request: A produces a set
of users U , an identity ID, and a cipher-
text C. The challenger generates the private
key DID = Keygen(ID) and sends the re-
sult of Unsigncrypt(U , DID, C) toA (this result
can be the ⊥ symbol if C is an invalid cipher-
text).
– Key extraction request: A produces an identity
ID and receives the extracted private key DID =
Keygen(ID).
A can present its requests adaptively: every re-
quest may depend on the answer to the previous
ones.
• A chooses two plaintexts m0,m1 ∈ M , a user set
UA and an identity IDB on which he wants to be chal-
lenged. He cannot have asked the private key corre-
sponding to any user in the group UA nor IDB in the
first stage.
• The challenger takes a bit b ∈R {0, 1} and computes
the ciphertext C of mb which is sent to A.
• A asks again a polynomially bounded number of re-
quests just like in the first stage. This time, he can-
not make a key extraction request on any user in the
groupUA nor IDB and he cannot ask the plaintext cor-
responding to C.
• Finally, A produces a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ =
b.





We require that ε to be negligible in k.
Definition 4 An identity based ring signcryption
scheme(IDRSC)is said to be secure against an existen-
tial forgery for adaptive chosen messages attacks(EF-
IDRSC-ACMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has
a non-negligeable advantage in the following game:
• The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a secu-
rity parameter k and gives the system parameters to
the adversary A.
• TheadversaryA performsa polynomial boundednum-
ber of requests as in the previous definition.
• Finally, A produces a new triple (U , ID, C)(i.e. a
triple that was not produced by the signcryption ora-
cle), where the private keys of the users in the group U
and the receiver (whose identity is ID) were not asked
in the second stage and wins the game if the result of
the Unsigncryption(U , ID, C) is not the ⊥ symbol.
In this definition, the adversary is allowed to ask the
private key corresponding to the receiver’s identity ID
for which the ciphertext he produces must be valid.
This condition is necessary to obtain the non-repudiation
property and to prevent a dishonest recipient to send a
cipertext to himself on the group U ’s behalf and try to
convince a third party that the group U was the sender.
4. Our ID-Based Ring Signcryption
Scheme
In this section, we present our identity based ring sign-
cryption scheme from bilinear pairing. We describe our
scheme by providing the description of the following algo-
rithms: Key Generation, Signcryption, Unsigncryption.
4.1. Key Generation
Given security parameters k and l, a trusted pri-
vate key generator (PKG) chooses two groups G1, G2 of
prime order q > 2k, a bilinear map ê from G1×G1 → G2,
and a generator P of G1. Next, PKG picks a ran-
dom number s ∈ Z∗q as its master key and com-
putes its public key Ppub = sP . Then it chooses
3
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some cryptographic hash functions described as fol-
lows: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1; H2 : G2 → {0, 1}l; H3 :
{0, 1}l → {0, 1}l; H4 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q . The secu-
rity analysis will view H1, H2,H3,H4 as random ora-
cles. The message space is M = {0, 1}l. Finally, PKG
publishes{G1, G2, ê, P, Ppub,H1,H2, H3,H4, q}, but s is
kept secret.
Extract: For a user Ui whose identification information is
IDi, PKG computes Qi = H1(IDi) and calculates the
user’s secret key as Di = sQi where s is the PKG’s mas-
ter key and sends Di to Ui via a secure and authenticated
channel.
4.2. Signcryption
Consider a set of users U = {u1, u2, · · · , un}. Let Qi
denote Ui’s public information (where Qi = H1(IDi))
and Di denotes his secret key. In the following scenario,
without losing generality, we assume a user us ∈ U would
like to signcrypt a message m on behalf of the group U
and send it to a receiver, Bob, whose identity is IDB .
Then, us will perform the following.
• Choose a0 ∈R Z∗q , mr ∈R M and compute
R0 = a0P, R
′
0 = ê(a0Ppub, QB), k = H2(R
′
0), c1 =
mr ⊕ k, c2 = m ⊕ H3(mr).
• For i = s, choose ai ∈R Z∗q . Compute Ai =
aiP, Ri = ê(Ai, P ), hi = H4(U ,m, k,Ri).
• For i = s, choose as ∈R Z∗q . Compute As =
asP,Rs = ê(As, P ) · ê(−Ppub,
∑
i =s hi · Qi). If Rs =
1G2 or Rs = Ri for some i = s, then repeat step 3
until he obtains an admissible Rs.
• Compute hs = H4(U ,m, k,Rs), σ = hs · Ds +∑n
i=1 Ai.
• Define the ciphertext of message m as:
C = (U , c1, c2, σ,R0, R1, · · · , Rn, h1, h2, · · · , hn)
and sends C to Bob.
4.3. Unsigncryption
Upon receiving the ciphertext C = (U , c1, c2, σ,R0,
R1, · · · , Rn, h1, h2, · · · , hn), Bob unsigncrypts the cipher-
text, C, using his secret key DB :
• k′ = H2(ê(R0, DB)), recovers m′r = c1 ⊕ k′, m′ =
c2 ⊕ H3(m′r).
• For i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, checks whether
hi = H4(U ,m′, k′, Ri)
• Checks whether ê(σ, P ) = R1 · R2 · ... · Rn ·
ê(Ppub,
∑n
i=1 hi · Qi).
If for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, hi = H4(U ,m′, k′, Ri) and
ê(σ, P ) = R1 ·R2 · ...·, Rn · ê(Ppub,
∑n
i=1 hi ·Qi), Bob ac-
cepts m as an valid message. Otherwise, Bob rejects m.
Correctness and Consistency.
If the ciphertext C is not altered, the following equations
will hold.
ê(R0, DB) = ê(a0P, DB) = ê(sa0P,QB)
= ê(a0Ppub, QB) = R′0
Hence,
k′ = H2(ê(R0, DB)) = k
m′r = c1 ⊕ k′ = mr
m′ = c2 ⊕ H3(m′r) = m
and finally
∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, hi ?= H4(U , m′, k′, Ri)
will hold with equality.
Moreover,
R1 · R2 · ... · Rn · ê(Ppub,
n∑
i=1
hi · Qi) =




hi · Qi) · ê(Ppub,
n∑
i=1








Ai + hs · Ds, P ) = ê(σ, P ).
Anonymity.
The unconditional anonymity of the scheme is also clear.
The scheme is completely symmetric, and hence, any
third party outside the group U has probability 1/n
(where n denotes the size of the group) to guess which




In this section, we will provide a formal proof that the
IDRSC is IND-IDRSC-CCA assuming the Decisional Bi-
linear Diffle-Hellman problem is hard.
Theorem 1 In the random oracle model, we assume an
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks adversary A that can
distinguish ciphertexts from the users set U during the
game of definition 1 with an advantage ε when running in a
time t and asking at most qH1 identity hashing requests, at
most qH2H2 requests, qH3H3 requests, qH4H4 requests, at
most qE Key extraction requests, qk Signcryption requests
and qU Unsigncryption requests. Then there exists a distin-
guisher B that can solve the Decisional Bilinear Diffle-
Hellman problem with an advantage:
Adv(B) ≥ 1
en+qE
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Here e ≈ 2.71 is the base of the natural logarithm, n is the
number of the users set U , k is system’s security parame-
ter. The running time of B is O(t).
Proof: The distinguisher B receives a random in-
stance (P, aP, bP, cP, h) of the Decisional Bilinear Diffle-
Hellman problem. His goal is to decide whether h =
ê(P, P )abc or not. B will run A as subroutine and act as
A’s challenger in the IND-IDRSC-CCA game. B needs
to maintain lists L1, L2, L3, L4 that are initially empty
and are used to keep track of answers to queries asked
by A to oracles H1,H2,H3,H4 respectively. We assume
that any signcryption or unsigncyption request between
a group U and an identity ID happens after A asked the
hashing H1 of this ID and the identities in the group
U . Any key extraction query on the identity is also pre-
ceded by a hash query on the same identity. We also as-
sume that A never makes an unsigncryption query on
a ciphertext obtained from the signcryption oracle. He
only makes unsigncryption queries for observed cipher-
text.
At the beginning of the game , B runs the Setup pro-
gram with the parameter k, and gives A the system pa-
rameters {G1, G2, ê, P, Ppub,H1,H2,H3,H4, q} with
Ppub = cP (c is unknown to B and plays the role of the
PKG’s master-key). H1,H2, H3,H4 are random ora-
cles described as follows:
H1 requests: At any time, A can ask a polynomi-
ally bounded number of H1 requests on identities of his
choice. To respond these queries, B maintains the list L1
of tuples (ID, QID, b, c). The list is initially empty. When
A queries the oracle H1, B responds as follows:
• At the jth H1 request, B answers by H1(IDj) = bP ,
and let cj = 0(We assume that before the jth H1
requests, there is no tuple (IDj , Qj , bj , cj) in the list
L1).
• For i = j, B responds as follows:
– If the IDi already appears on the L1 in the
tuple(IDi, Qi, bi, ci), then B responds with
H1(IDi) = Qi.
– Otherwise, B generates a random coin ∈ {0, 1}
so that Pr[coin = 1] = δ, for some δ that will
be determined later. Let ci = coin.
• B picks a random bi ∈ Z∗q , computes Qi = biP .
• B adds the tuple (IDi, Qi, bi, ci) to the list L1, and
responds to A with H1(IDi) = Qi.
H2 requests: At any time, A can ask a polynomi-
ally bounded number of H2 requests of his choice. To re-
spond these queries, B maintains the list L2 of tuples
(Re, ke). The list is initially empty. When A queries the
oracle H2 of the request H2(Ri), B first searches a pair
(Ri, ki) in list L2. If such a pair is found, B answers
by ki. Otherwise he answers A by a random binary se-
quence ki ∈R {0, 1}l such that no entry (·, ki) appears in
L2(in order to avoid collisions on H2) and adds the pair
(Ri, ki) to L2.
H3 requests: At any time, A can ask a polynomi-
ally bounded number of H3 requests of his choice. To re-
spond these queries, B maintains the list L3 of tuples
(me, ne). The list is initially empty. When A queries the
oracle H3 of the request H3(mi), B first searches a pair
(mi, ni) in list L3. If such a pair is found, B answers
by ni. Otherwise, he answers A by a random binary se-
quence ni ∈R {0, 1}l such that no entry (·, ni) appears in
L3(in order to avoid collisions on H3) and adds the pair
(mi, ni) in L3.
H4 requests: At any time, A can ask a polynomi-
ally bounded number of H4 requests of his choice. To re-
spond these queries, B maintains the list L4 of tuples
(xe, ye). The list is initially empty. When A queries the
oracle H4 of the request H4(Ui,mi, ki, Ri), B computes
xi = Ui ‖ mi ‖ ki ‖ Ri and searches a pair (xi, yi) in list
L4. If such a pair is found, B answers by yi. Otherwise he
answers A by a random binary sequence yi ∈R F ∗q such
that no entry (·, yi) appears in L4(in order to avoid col-
lisions on H4) and adds the pair (xi, yi) in L4.
Key Extraction requests: At any time, A can ask a
polynomially bounded number of key extraction requests
of his choice. When A asks a query keygen(IDi), B first
finds the corresponding tuple (IDi, Qi, bi, ci) in L1(From
the assumption we know that there must be such a tuple
in L1). If ci = 0, B fails and stops. Otherwise if ci = 1, B
computes the secret key Di = bi ·Ppub = c ·Qi, then B re-
turns Di to A.
Signcryption requests: At any time, A can perform
a signcryption request for a plaintext m , a user group
U and a designated receiver with identity ID. B rando-
maly chooses a user uA in the group U whose identity is
IDA and not IDj ( in this case, B can computes u′As se-
cret key DA = bA · Ppub where bA is in the correspond-
ing tuple(IDA, QA, bA, cA) in the list L1). Then B uses
u′As secret key and runs Signcryption(U , ID, m) to sign-
crypt the message on the behalf of the group U . At last,
B returns the result ciphertext C to A.
Unsigncryption requests: At any time, A can per-
form an unsigncryption request for a ciphertext
C = (U , c1, c2, σ, R0, R1, · · · , Rn, h1, h2, · · · , hn) be-
tween the group U and receiver whose identity is ID.
If ID = IDj , B always notifies A that the cipher-
text is invalid(because B does not know the secret
key of the user whose identity is IDj ). If this ci-
phertext C is a valid one, the probability that
A will find is no more than 1/2k. In other case
where the receiver’s identity is not IDj , B computes
k′ = H2(ê(R0, DID)), m′r = c1 ⊕ k′,m′ = c2 ⊕ H3(m′r).
Then B checks whether hi = H4(U ,m, k,Ri) and
ê(σ, P ) = R1 · R2 · ... · Rn · ê(Ppub,
∑n
i=1 hi · Qi). If
for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, hi = H4(U ,m, k,Ri) and
ê(σ, P ) = R1 · R2 · ...·, Rn · ê(Ppub,
∑n
i=1 hi · Qi), B no-
tifies A that the ciphertext C is valid one, otherwise
B notifies A that C is not a valid ciphertext be-
5
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tween U and some user whose identity is ID.
Challenge: After a polynomially bounded number
of queries, A chooses two messages m0,m1 ∈ M, n
users whose identities are {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn} to form
a users set U and another user whose identity is ID. If
ID = IDj , B fails and stops. For ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , n}, if
ci = 1 in the corresponding tuple (IDi, Qi, bi, ci) in L1,
B also fails and stops. If such U and the receiver are ad-
missible, B chooses b ∈R {0, 1} and let R0 = aP,R′0 = h,
then B signcrypts the message mb as described in the
signcryption request and sends the ciphertext C to A.
A asks again a polynomially bounded number of re-
quests just like in the first stage. This time, he can-
not know the secret key of any user in the group U
nor IDj and he cannot ask the plaintext correspond-
ing to the ciphertext C. At the end of the simulation,
he produces a bit b′ for which he believes the relation
C = Signcrypt(U , IDj , mb) holds and sends b′ to B . At
this moment, if b = b′, B then answers 1 as a result be-
cause his selection h allowed him to produce a cipher-
text C that appeared to A as a valid signcrypted text of
mb. If b = b′, B then answers 0.
We now consider B’s probability of success. We find
that the probability that B does not fail during the key
extraction requests is obvious δqE where qE is the num-
ber of key extraction requests. Then we also see that dur-
ing the challenge process the probability that B does not
fail is (1 − δ)n/qH1 . Therefore, the probability that B
does not abort during the simulation is δqE (1− δ)n/qH1 .
This value is maximized at δopt = 1 − n/(qE + n). Us-
ing δopt, the probability that B does not abort is at least
(1/qH1)(1/e)
n+qE . The probability that B gave an false
answer during the Unsigncryption process is no more
than qU/2k. Finally, let
p1 = P [b = b





p0 = P [b
′ = i|h ∈R G2] = 1/2 for i = 0, 1
and hence, we obtain
Adv(B) = |Pa,b,c∈RFq,h∈RG2 [1 ← B(aP, bP, cP, h)]
−Pa,b,c∈RFq [1 ← B(aP, bP, cP, ê(P, P )abc)]














The unforgeability against adaptive chosen-messages at-
tacks can be derived directly from the security of Herranz
and Sáez’s ID-based ring signature scheme [21] under the
computational Diffle-Hellman assumption. One can find
that an attacker who can forge a valid signcrypted mes-
sage of IDRSC must be able to forge a valid signature for
the scheme of Herranz and Sáez’s ID-based ring signa-
ture.
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